

## Relevant and Reliable Information

**The most sophisticated analysis becomes worthless when built on quicksand.** In strategic decisions, teams often drown in data while missing the handful of facts that actually matter.

**Relevant and Reliable Information**—the third link in **Decision Quality (DQ)**—isn’t about gathering *more* information; it’s about knowing **what to trust** and **when to stop**. Once you’ve framed the right question (step 1) and generated alternatives (step 2), this step determines whether your analysis produces **insight** or **illusion**.<sup>6</sup>

### The theory in brief (why information quality determines strategy outcomes)

Strategic choices unfold under uncertainty. Leaders naturally try to reduce that uncertainty with more analysis—but additional data only improves a decision when it would change what you choose or meaningfully shift the odds. **Expected Value of Information (EVI)** formalizes this intuition: if learning something wouldn’t alter the choice, or the benefit is smaller than the cost and delay of acquiring it, move forward.<sup>1,2</sup>

Even with the right focus, teams systematically misuse information. They over-rely on the **inside view**—detailed narratives about *this* project, *our* market, *our* capabilities—while ignoring **base rates**. Decades of research show this pattern produces predictable errors: optimism bias, planning fallacy, and base-rate neglect.<sup>3,4</sup> The remedy is the **outside view** via **reference class forecasting**: find comparable efforts, examine the outcome distribution, and adjust from that baseline. Well-implemented reference classes have been associated with markedly better cost and schedule realism in large programs.<sup>7</sup>

Information quality depends as much on **process** as on **sources**. **Procedural rationality**—clear, information-rich methods—correlates with more effective strategic decisions.<sup>5</sup> In practice this means distinguishing **facts** from **assumptions** from **opinions**, triangulating across methods and sources, and applying basic **credibility tests** (e.g., peer-reviewed vs. personal blog; primary data vs. anecdote; independent corroboration). When these disciplines combine, you get information that is both **relevant** (decision-critical, timely) and **reliable** (accurate, traceable)—exactly what DQ demands.<sup>6</sup>

## From theory to practice: making information relevant *and* reliable

These seven practices operationalize decades of research on judgment under uncertainty, turning academic insight into executive discipline.

### A. Start with decision-critical uncertainties

Why it works.	What good looks like.
<p>Sensitivity analysis shows most strategic choices pivot on a <b>small set</b> of variables while remaining insensitive to dozens of others; in decision trees and influence diagrams only variables that can <b>flip the preferred alternative</b> or materially change expected value warrant deep investigation.<sup>1,2,9</sup> Focusing on those few uncertainties is a core expression of <b>procedural rationality</b>, which correlates with higher strategic decision effectiveness.<sup>5</sup></p>	<p>An <b>Uncertainty Map</b> listing <b>3–5</b> variables that swing the decision, each with rough sensitivity and the <b>minimum evidence</b> needed. Everything else explicitly out of scope. If it won't change the choice, it's not on the map.</p>

### B. Use Expected Value of Information (know when to stop)

Why it works.	What good looks like.
<p><b>Information value theory</b> Expected Value of Perfect Information (EVPI) / Expected Value of Sample Information (EVSI) formalizes when learning is worth it: additional data has value only if it <b>changes the choice or the odds</b> net of cost and delay.<sup>1,2</sup> Executives often grasp the idea but skip even rough calculations, leading to both analysis paralysis (negative VOI) and missed high-VOI opportunities.<sup>1</sup></p>	<p>A <b>VOI calculation</b> per major uncertainty showing <b>value of learning vs. cost/delay</b> and a clear <b>STOP/CONTINUE</b> call. When VOI &lt; cost (including <b>cost of delay</b>), move forward; if VOI is high but time-constrained, convert to a <b>small, fast test</b> (see G).</p>

### C. Anchor forecasts in base rates (the outside view)

Why it works.	What good looks like.
<p><b>Base-rate neglect</b> is a robust error: people overweight case specifics and ignore class statistics.<sup>3</sup> <b>Reference class forecasting</b> counters this by anchoring estimates in the <b>observed distribution</b> of comparable efforts; in large programs this improves cost and schedule realism materially.<sup>4,7</sup></p>	<p>A <b>Base-Rate Box</b>: reference class (<math>n \geq 10</math>), median and <b>10th/90th</b> percentile outcomes, and the <b>delta</b> to the inside-view estimate. The final forecast explicitly reconciles any material deviation from the base rate with <b>testable reasons</b>.</p>

#### D. Apply source credibility and triangulation

Why it works.	What good looks like.
<p>Combining <b>independent</b> estimates reduces error proportional to their independence and individual accuracy (the “wisdom of crowds” effect); structured triangulation across methods raises validity.<sup>9,11,12</sup> Classic decision-trap research shows single-source reliance creates blind spots; <b>credibility tests</b> (peer-reviewed vs. blog; primary data vs. anecdote; independent corroboration) reduce systematic error.<sup>8,12,13</sup></p>	<p>A one-page <b>Source Table</b> for decision-critical claims: source type, provenance/date, known biases, <b>corroboration status</b>. Each input labeled <b>Fact / Supported assumption / Opinion</b>. No single-source dependencies on critical elements.</p>

#### E. Balance internal and external evidence

Why it works.	What good looks like.
<p>Organizations tend toward <b>local search</b> (over-relying on familiar, internal information). Integrating <b>internal specificity</b> with <b>external benchmarks</b> (market/competitor/technology) improves judgment quality and guards against echo chambers; comprehensive, information-rich processes are linked to more effective strategic decisions.<sup>5,6</sup></p>	<p>A <b>360° Evidence Panel</b> placing internal trends beside external indicators with a one-line <b>convergence/divergence</b> read-out. When signals conflict, include one <b>testable hypothesis</b> for reconciliation and the check that will resolve it.</p>

#### F. Make uncertainty explicit (calibration beats false precision)

Why it works.	What good looks like.
<p><b>Overconfidence</b> is pervasive; most forecasters are under-calibrated at high confidence levels. Expressing <b>ranges/probabilities</b> with short confidence notes forces recognition of unknowns and enables <b>Bayesian-style updating</b> as evidence arrives; elite forecasters differentiate themselves primarily by <b>calibration</b>, not clairvoyance.<sup>9,11</sup></p>	<p>All critical estimates as <b>P10–P50–P90</b> ranges (or explicit probabilities) plus a two-bullet <b>confidence note</b>: drivers of uncertainty and the <b>next update</b>. Point estimates are banned for decision-critical quantities; top forecasts get a <b>quarterly calibration review</b>.</p>

## G. Learn fast: turn assumptions into facts

Why it works.	What good looks like.
<p>Discovery-driven planning treats learning as a staged investment: identify “killer assumptions,” run cheap, fast tests, and adjust commitment based on evidence—real-options logic for strategy.<sup>10</sup> This converts high-VOI assumptions into observed data quickly.</p>	<p>A <b>Learn-then-Decide</b> plan: <b>1–2 rapid tests</b> (pilot, pre-order, external panel) with <b>kill/surge triggers</b> (“If paid conversion <math>\geq 5\%</math> on 200 invites <math>\rightarrow</math> proceed; if <math>&lt; 3\%</math> <math>\rightarrow</math> pivot/stop”). Every critical assumption either has base-rate support <b>or</b> a scheduled test with <b>date-stamped</b> rules.</p>

### Practical limitations (and how to work with them)

- **Information that won’t move the choice.** Teams chase “interesting” facts rather than decision-critical ones. Start with an **Uncertainty Map** (the 3–5 variables that swing value). Tie every data request to a mapped uncertainty and include a one-line **VOI note**; if VOI  $<$  cost of delay, move.<sup>1,2,9</sup>
- **Confirmation shopping and single-source linchpins.** Preference-consistent search produces fragile conclusions. Use a one-page **Source Table** for decision-critical claims (type, provenance/date, biases, **corroboration status**). Demand independent **triangulation** ( $\geq 2$  sources) or a dated plan to obtain it, and schedule a 30-minute **adversarial evidence review** before down-select.<sup>8,12,13</sup>
- **False precision and overconfidence.** Point estimates invite misplaced certainty. Express all decision-critical quantities as **P10–P50–P90** (or probabilities) with a two-bullet **confidence note** (drivers of uncertainty; next update). Run **quarterly calibration** on the top forecasts (e.g., Brier scores).<sup>9,11</sup>
- **Sparse or noisy data.** Strategic questions rarely come with clean datasets. Use **structured expert judgment** (document rationales; avoid groupthink), anchor with **adjacent base rates**, prefer **replicable** findings over one-offs, and convert high-value assumptions into **rapid tests** where possible.<sup>2,3,10</sup>
- **Information politics.** Incentives shape what is surfaced and how it’s framed. Separate **evidence generation** from **decision rights** (name an **Evidence Lead** distinct from the “D”), standardize artifacts (Uncertainty Map, Base-Rate Box, Source Table, VOI notes), and run a brief **red-team** challenge of the evidence pack.<sup>5,6,8,12</sup>
- **Divergent internal vs. external signals.** Internal metrics offer specificity; external indicators provide context—often on different clocks. When they conflict, state the **most plausible reconciliation** (e.g., mix shift, sampling bias) and the **check** (experiment, audit, third-party data) that will resolve it by a date.<sup>5,6</sup>

## Generative AI as scaffold (not substitute)

**Where AI helps.** Draft **reference classes** and external benchmarks; summarize qualitative corpora (VOC, interviews) into themes; assemble **issue trees** and **uncertainty maps**; highlight **conflicts** among sources; propose **ranges** using comparable cases. This accelerates relevance (focus) and reliability (coverage).<sup>3,4,7</sup>

**Where AI must not replace you.** Don't outsource **values**, **risk posture**, or **confidence calls**. Require **source-tagging** (asserted vs. cited) and a short **confidence note** with any model output; keep sensitive data within approved environments.<sup>6,12</sup>

### A quick AI-assisted pass.

1. List the **3–5 decision-critical uncertainties** and the **minimum evidence** that would move the choice.
2. Generate **reference classes** and base rates (medians + spreads) from credible sources.
3. Summarize **convergent themes** across internal dashboards, customer comments, and analyst reports; flag inconsistencies.
4. Draft **ranges** and a **VOI note** for each uncertainty; recommend where to stop or run a small test.<sup>1-4</sup>

## Bottom Line

Information doesn't have to be perfect; it has to be **fit for the decision**. Prioritize decision-critical uncertainties, use VOI to stop, anchor on base rates, and enforce credibility and triangulation. Do that, and you'll meet the DQ standard for **Relevant & Reliable Information**—without boiling the ocean. The payoff is faster, clearer choices—and fewer surprises after you commit.<sup>1-7</sup>

## References

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